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Federal Courts—Implied Rights of Action: Transamerica Advisers, Inc. v.
Lewis' — In J.I. Case Co. 7J. Borak, 2 decided in 1964, the Supreme Court of the
United States recognized an implied right of action under section 14(a) 3 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 4 The Borak Court, in explaining its
holding, emphasized that an implied right of action was necessary to effec-
tuate the congressional purpose behind the statute's enactment.' In Trans-
america v. Lewis,' however, decided in 1979, it was irrelevant to the Supreme
Court whether a private remedy was needed to effectuate the congressional
purpose of a statute.' Instead, the Lewis Court denied an implied right of
action under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 8 solely be-
cause it could find no legislative intent in the wording or legislative history of
the statute to create such a remedy." Thus, the Borak and Lewis decisions
together indicate that, in a fifteen year span, the Supreme Court underwent a
dramatic shift in its attitude towards implied rights of action. This casenote
will analyze the Court's drastic change in its position—a change which culmi-
nated in the decision of Transamerica v. Lewis.
In Lewis, Mortgage Trust of America (the Trust) was qualified under the
Internal Revenue Code as a real estate investment trust," investing chiefly in
construction and development first mortgage loans." The employees and of-
ficers of the Trust had been associated previously with Transamerica Land
Capital, Inc. (Land Capital), from whom the Trust purchased its original
portfolio of mortgages.' 2 The investment adviser retained by the Trust was
Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. (Mortgage Advisers), whose sole client
was and always had been the Trust." It advised the Trust on various real
estate investments and administered the Trust's daily operations." Both
Land Capital and Mortgage Advisers were subsidiaries of and controlled by
Transamerica Corporation (Transamerica), the sponsor of the Trust."
In 1974, Harry Lewis, a shareholder of the Trust, instituted a derivative
action on behalf of the Trust and a class action on behalf of the Trust's
shareholders in federal district court." Named as defendants were the Trust,
several of its trustees, Mortgage Advisers, Land Capital, and Transamerica."
' 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
2 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
4 377 U.S. at 430-31.
5 Id. at 433.
' 444 U.S. at 11.
Id. at 24.
" 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). The Investment Advisers Act is codified at 15
U.S.C.
	
806-1 to 80h-21 (1976).
9 444 U.S. at 24.
" Mortgage Trust of America was a real estate investment trust within the
meaning of H 856-858 of the Internal Revenue Code.
" Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S.
11 (1979).




1 " Id. at 237.
17 444 U.S. at 13.
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Lewis alleged that under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 the defendants
had been guilty of various frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty in the course
of advising or managing the Trust.' 8 In the derivative action Lewis sought an
injunction against further performance of' the advisory contract, recission
of the advisory contract, restitution of the consideration paid by the Trust to
Mortgage Advisers, and an accounting of illegal profits.'° In the class action
he sought an award for damages. 2° The district court held that section 206
of the Investment Advisers Act, which makes it unlawful for an investment
adviser to employ a scheme or device to defraud a client, or to engage in any
business which serves as a fraud upon a client," provides no private right of
action. 22 The complaint, therefore, was dismissed. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the district court. It held that
the implication of a private right of action for injunctive relief and damages
under the Investment Advisers Act in favor of appropriate plaintiffs is neces-
113 hi. at 13-14. Lewis brought three causes of action, each of which was said to
arise under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The first alleged that the advisory
contract between Mortgage Advisers and the Trust was unlawful because both parties
to the contract had failed to register in accordance with the Investment Advisers Act,
and because the contract had provided for excessive fees to be paid by the Trust. Id. at
13. The second alleged that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to the
Trust by having it purchase securities of inferior quality from Land Capital, which,
like Mortgage Advisers, was a subsidiary of Transamerica. Id. The third alleged that
the defendants had misappropriated profitable investment opportunities for the ben-
efit of other companies affiliated with Transamerica, while such opportunities should
have inured to the Trust. Id. at 13-14.
19
 Id. at 14.
2" Id.
21
 Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976), reads
as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indi-
rectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or
prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any se-
curity to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a
person other than such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of
any security for the account of such client, without disclosing to such client.
in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in which
he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction. The
prohibitions of this paragraph shall not apply to any transaction with a
customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is not acting as an
investment adviser in relation to such transaction;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the
purposes of this paragraph (4) by rules and regulations define, and pre-
scribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and
courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
22
 Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., No. C73-2180 RHS (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 7,
1974), rev'd, 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978), afrd, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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sary to achieve the aim of Congress in enacting the legislation." Finding the
plaintiffs here to be "appropriate," the court of appeals vacated the lower
court's order of dismissal and remanded the case to the district court for fur-
ther proceedings. 24
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on defendant's appeal." In a 5-4
decision, the Supreme Court HELD: A limited private remedy exists under
the Investment Advisers Act to void an investment advisers contract, but the
Act confers no other private causes of action, legal or equitable.' Specifically,
the Court found that while the private remedy of contract recission is implied
under section 2 15 of the Act," no private right of action for damages is im-
plied under section 206, the Act's general anti-fraud provision."
In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court noted initially that the In-
vestment Advisers Act nowhere provides expressly for a private cause of ac-
tion.'" Thus the issue before the Court was whether it should imply a private
cause of action under the Act in favor of the clients of investment advisers. 30
23 Lewis v. 'Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2(1 at 239. Rather than elaborating
upon the reasoning for its holding, the court of appeals stated that it adopted the
rationale of two previous circuit court decisions, Wilson v. First Houston Investment
Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 444 U.S. 959 (1979), and
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978), both of which had found an implied right of action tinder the Investment
Advisers Act. 575 F.2d at 238. The Wilson court had noted that Congress' goal in
enacting the Investment Advisers Act was to protect. investors from the possibility of
overreaching and fraudulent conduct on the part of investment advisers. 566 F.2d at
1243. To satisfy this goal, the Wilson court implied a private remedy in favor of inves-
tors under section 206 of the Act. Id. The Abrahamson court reached the same result.,
reasoning that the implication of a private remedy was necessary because the SEC—
the agency charged with enforcement of federal securities laws, such as the Investment
Advisers Act—does not have sufficient resources alone to enforce the ninny provisions
of these statutes. 568 F.2d at 874.
24
 Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2c1 at 239.
25 439 U.S. 952 (1978).
26 444 U.S. at 24-25.
27 Id. at 19. Section 215 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15
(1976), reads in pertinent part:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter
and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of
which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or
practice in violation of any provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regu-
lation, or order thereunder, shall be void (I) as regards the rights of any
person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, regulation, or order,
shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, and
(2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to such
contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge
of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such con-
tract was in violation of any such provision.
Id.
" 444 U.S. at 19-20.
2. 9 Id. at 14. The Court observed that the only provision of the Act authorizing
any suits to enforce the obligations or duties created by it is section 209, 15 U.S.G. §
80h-9 (1976), which permits the SEC to bring suit to enjoin violations of the Act. 444
U.S. at 14.
3" 444 U.S. at 13.
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The Court indicated that the key to deciding if a private remedy should be
implied was whether Congress had intended to create such a remedy.' Ac-
cording to the Court, this determination of congressional intent essentially was
a matter of statutory construction. 32
Having stated its approach to implied rights of action in general terms,
the Lewis Court turned its attention specifically to sections 215 and 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act. In considering section 215, the Court discussed its
two reasons for determining that this provision showed a congressional intent
to create a private cause of action for recission, for restitution, and for an
injunction against continued operation of the contract. First, the Court main-
tained that section 215, by declaring certain contracts void, necessarily con-
templated that the issue of voidness may be litigated somewhere." Second,
the Court noted that it had previously implied a private right to rescind a
void contract in section 29(b) 34
 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a
provision comparable to section 215. 35
 The Court thus concluded that this
same principle should govern with respect to section 215. 36
 For these reasons
the Court granted an implied remedy under section 215.
In contrast to its holding with respect to section 215, the Lewis Court
refused to grant an implied remedy under section 206 of the Investment Ad-
visers Act because it found that Congress had not intended to authorize a
private right of action under that provision." The Court explained this find-
ing first by referring to a canon of statutory construction—that where a stat-
ute expressly provides a specific remedy or remedies, a court must be wary of
reading others into it." This canon is commonly known as the expressio unius
est exclusio alterius principle. 39 Applying this principle to the Investment Ad-
37 Id. at 15-16.
32 Id. at 15.
" Id. at 18. The Court noted that an implied statutory permission to litigate
somewhere the issue of voidness under section 215 could mean merely that section 215
would be raised defensively to prevent enforcement of an investment adviser's con-
tract. Id. The Lewis Court went on to say, however, that traditional notions of equity
jurisprudence, presumably known to Congress, indicated that one who has the power
to void a contract may also resort to a court for recission of the contract and for
restitution of any consideration paid. Id.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976). Section 29(b) of the 1934 Act provides in perti-
nent part:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder ... shall be void (1) as regards the rights of
any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation,
shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract
Id.
35
 444 U.S. at 18-19. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388
(1970).
36
 444 U.S. at 19.
37 Id. at 19, 20.
36
 Id. at 19.
39
 According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979), this Latin ex-
pression has been interpreted as the "expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another:" After being utilized earlier in T.1.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464,
470-71 (1959), and Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 288-89
(1929), the expressio maxim was revived in National Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n
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visers Act, the Court. noted that because Congress had explicitly provided cer-
tain criminal and administrative methods for enforcing compliance with sec-
tion 206 elsewhere in the Act," it was unlikely that. Congress had merely
forgotten to add an express private civil remedy within section 206 itself. 4 '
The Court did observe that the expressio maxim could yield to persuasive evi-
dence of a contrary legislative intent. It. stated, however, that any additional
evidence in this case indicated, if anything, an intent not to have the implied
remedy. 42
 To illustrate this point, the Court turned its attention to the struc-
ture of enforcement provisions in legislative schemes enacted in other se-
curities laws. In each of the securities laws enacted prior to the Investment
Advisers Act, and in the Act's companion legislation, the Investment Com-
pany Act,43
 Congress had expressly authorized private suits for damages in
prescribed circumstances." The Court assumed, therefore, that Congress
knew how to create a private damage remedy when it wanted one. 45 Con-
sequently, according to the Court, the absence of such an express remedy in
section 206 strongly suggested that Congress did not intend for one to be
implied.46
After applying the expressio maxim to section 206, the Court further
explained its refusal to imply a private remedy under that section by referring
to the legislative history of section 214,47
 the jurisdictional section of the Act,
of R.R. Passengers, 4l4 U.S. 453, 458 (1974), rehearing denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Amtrak]. See text and notes at notes 259-61 infra for a discussion
of this maxim.
40 Under § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3, the Securities Exchange Commission can
impose various administrative sanctions on persons who violate provisions of the Act,
including § 206. 444 U.S. at 20. Under § 209, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976), the Securities
Exchange Commission is authorized to bring civil actions in federal courts to enjoin
compliance with the Act, including § 206. Id. Under § 217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1976),
willful violations of the Act are criminal offenses punishable by fine, imprisonment, or
both. Id.
41 444 U.S. at. 20.
42
43 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976).
44
 444 U.S. at 20. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11-12 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
77k-771 (1976)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r (1976)); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, §§
16(a), 17(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79p(a), 79q(b) (1976)); Trust Indenture Act of
1939, § 323(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1976)); Investment Company Act of
1940, § 30(f) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1976)).
45
 444 U.S. at 21.
46 Id.
47 Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976), pro-
vides in pertinent part:
The district court of the United States and the United States courts of
any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of violations of this subchapter or the rules, regula-
tions, or orders thereunder, and, concurrently with State and territorial
courts, of all suits in equity to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or the
rules, regulations, or orders thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be
brought in the district wherein any act or transaction constituting the viola-
tion occurred. Any suit or action to enjoin any violation of this subchapter
or rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, may be brought in any such
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which granted jurisdiction only to actions in equity." The Court noted that.
early drafts of section 214 had incorporated by reference a provision of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 4 " giving federal courts jurisdic-
tion " 'of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by' the statute (emphasis added)." 0" The Court pointed out,
however, that the words "actions at law" were omitted from later versions of
the bill.''' The Court viewed section 214's present lack of reference to "ac-
tions at law" as additional evidence that. Congress did not intend the Invest-
ment Advisers Act to be construed as granting a private right. of action for
anything beyond the limited equitable relief the Court had recognized under
section 215.52
 Thus the Lewis Court's brief consideration of legislative history
and its thorough application of the expressio maxim caused its refusal to imply
a private remedy under section 206.
In determining that a private right of action could not be found under
section 206, the majority did not utilize the entire four factor approach for
implied rights of action laid down by the Court four years before in Cart v.
Ash." While basing its decision regarding an implied right of action under
section 206 solely on a consideration of one of the Curt factors—whether
there was evidence of a legislative intent to create a private cause of
action 5 4
 — th e Lewis Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that it consider
district or in the district wherein the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts
business, and process in such cases may be served in any district of which
the defendant is an inhabitant or minsacts business or wherever the defen-
dant may be found.
Id.
48
 444 U.S. at 21.
4" The Public Utility Holding Company Act is codifed at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to
79z-6 (1976).
5" 444 U.S. at 22 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1976)).
51 Id. at 22 n.12. See note 47 supra. The plaintiff argued that the omission of
any reference in § 214 to "actions at law" was irrelevant because jurisdiction over a
case such as this would often exist, both in law as well as in equity, under the general
federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). 444 U.S. at 22 n.12. This
statute reads in pertinent part: "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy ... arises under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States .... 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). In addition, the
plaintiff contended that nowhere was it expressly stated that the omission was intended
to preclude private remedies for damages. 444 U.S. at 22 n.12. The plaintiff did con-
cede, however, that the language of § 214 was probably narrowed in view of the ab-
sence from the Act of any express provision for a private cause of action for damages.
Id.
52
 444 U.S. at. 24.
" 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The Court in Curt had stated the following factors
as relevant in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not ex-
pressly providing one: (1) is the plaintiff within the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted; (2) is there any indication of explicit or implicit legislative intent to
create or deny such a remedy; {3) would such a remedy for the plaintiff be consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; (4) is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law in an area basically a State concern, so that to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law would be inappropriate. Id. For a discus-
sion of Curt and the four Curt factors, see text and notes at notes 132-66 infra.






two additional Cart factors. 55 One of the Curt factors proposed by the plaintiff
was whether the implication of a private remedy would be useful in further-
ing the legislative scheme," while the other factor was whether the remedy
for such a violation was one traditionally relegated to state law. 57 In addition
to ignoring these factors, the Court. indicated that another Cart factor—
whether the plaintiff was in a class especially benefited by the statute"—
could be answered affirmatively in Lewis, but that satisfaction of this factor
did not require the implication of a private remedy for the Lewis plaintiff."
Rather, the Lewis Court viewed its inquiry into section 206 as ended because it
had already determined, through the use of the expressio maxim and a consid-
eration of legislative history, that Congress had not intended to create a pri-
vate cause of action under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act.'"
Therefore, it was irrelevant to the Lewis Court whether the four factor Cori
analysis was satisfied."'
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dis-
sented from the majority opinion in Lewis." In the dissenters' view, the
majority had departed from established principles by holding that private
rights of action under the Act are limited to recissions of investment advisers
contracts." To the dissent, this departure was clearly demonstrated by the
fact that prior decisions had recognized implied private actions for damages
under provisions of the securities laws with substantially the same language as
that of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act."
" 444 U.S. at 23. The Court noted that it had rejected the sante contentions
in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Touche Rossi, where it had been argued unsuccessfully that these two factors alone
justified the implication of a private cause of action under § 17a of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976). 444 U.S. at 23-24 (citing 442 U.S. at
575-76). For a discussion of Touche Ross, see text and notes at notes 201-25 infra.
5" 422 U.S. at 78.
57 444 U.S. at 23. See 422 U.S. at 78.
58 422 U.S. at 78.
39
 444 U.S. at 23-24.
'° Id. at 24.
61 In a One-sentence concurring opinion, Justice Powell joined the Court's
opinion, which he considered cotnpatible with his dissent in Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979). 444 U.S. at 25 (Powell, J., concurring). In his
Cannon dissent, Justice Powell had criticized the majority's implication of a private
remedy under § 901a of Title IX of the Education Amendment Acts of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976), because it was contrary to the separation of powers doctrine.
441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
62 444 U.S. at 25 (White, J., dissenting).
63 Id. The dissent noted that the majority's holding rejected the conclusion of
every circuit court of appeals that had considered the question. Id. See Lewis v. Trans-
america Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978); Wilson v. First Houston Investment
Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1977); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.
1977).
64 444 U.S. at 25 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that the provi-
sions of section 206 are substantially similar to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), both
of which have been held to create private causes of action for which damages may be
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In addition to criticizing the majority's decision for its lack of adherence
to precedent, the dissent analyzed section 206 under the four factor approach
of Cart v. Ash." Although it agreed with the majority that the implication of a
private right of action is limited solely to whether Congress intended to create
the private remedy, the dissent impliedly rejected the majority's view that the
issue would be decided by only one Cort factor—whether there was evidence
of such a legislative intent in either the statutory wording or the legislative
history. The dissent also rejected the majority's use of the expressio maxim in
determining legislative intent." To the dissent, all four Cart factors were to
be the criteria through which the congressional intent to create a private rem-
edy could be discerned. 67 In applying the Cort analysis, the Lewis dissent
found that a private remedy should have been implied under section 206
because that statutory provision satisfied each Cort factor. In applying the
three Cort factors that the Lewis majority had viewed as unnecessary in mak-
ing its determination, the dissent found that (I) the Lewis plaintiff was within
the class especially benefited by the statute; 69 (2) an implied private cause of
action would be compatible with effectuating the statutory purpose of the In-
vestment Advisers Act; 69 and (3) the regulation of investment advisers' ac-
tivities was not a traditional state concern."' In considering the Cort factor
applied by the majority, the dissent, unlike the majority, maintained that it
was satisfied because there existed evidence of a legislative intent to create a
recovered. 444 U.S. at 25-26 n.1 (White, J., dissenting). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bank-
ers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
65 444 U.S. at 27 (White, J., dissenting). See 422 U.S. - at 78.
66 444 U.S. at 29-30 n.6 (White, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 27 (White, J., dissenting). For a listing of the four Cort factors, see
note 53 supra.
68 444 U.S. at 27 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that § 206 was
enacted for the especial benefit of clients of investment advisers, since they would be
the victims of the fraudulent practices prohibited by that provision. Id. Applying this
to the situation at hand, the dissent observed that the plaintiff was representing the
client corporation, Mortgage Trust of America, and the client corporation's sharehold-
ers. Id. Both the client corporation and ultimately its shareholders allegedly had been
injured by violations of § 206. committed by the investment adviser. Transamerica
Mortgage Advisers, Inc. Id. Consequently, the dissent, like the majority, found the
plaintiff to be within the class especially benefited by § 206, and thus answered the
first Cart question in the affirmative. Id. at 27-28.
69 Id. at 34 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the purpose of the
Act was the prevention of fraudulent practices by investment advisers. Id. It then
reasoned that implication of a private right of action was needed to effectuate this
purpose because under the Act the SEC could seek only prospective equitable relief to
prevent future violations, and because the SEC, with the growth of the investment
advisory industry, could no longer handle the entire scope of the enforcement pro-
gram. Id. at 34-35 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent found that the Cart factor
pertaining to statutory purpose, when applied to the situation at hand, could be
answered in the affirmative. Id. at 35.
70 Id. at 36. The dissent's rationale for so concluding was that only six states
had legislation regulating the investment advisers industry, and state statutes sub-
sequently passed had been patterned after the federal legislation. Id. at 35-36. See
Note, Private Causes of Action Under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 74 MICH. I..
REV. 308, 324 (1975).
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private remedy under section 206. 7 ' According to the dissent, the fact that
section 215 implied a private remedy was evidence of such a legislative in-
tent." The dissent saw section 215 riot as a substantive provision but merely
as one non-exclusive consequence of a violation of section 206. 73 There-
fore, the dissent stated that the existence of one type of private action to
enforce a consequence of section 206 demonstrated that Congress con-
templated the use of implied private actions to redress other violations of
section 206 as well." In addition, the dissent reasoned that the majority had
confused the question of whether a cause of action exists with the question of
the nature of available relief, because it had limited private litigants injured
under section 206 to actions for contract recission under section 215.' 5 The
dissent pointed out that according to the Court's prior decisions, once it has
been recognized that a statute creates an implied cause of action, courts have
had wide discretion in fashioning both legal and equitable relief. 78
Having determined that. section 215 provided evidence of a legislative in-
tent to create a private cause of action under section 206, the dissent next
treated the majority's contention that the exclusion of "actions at law" from
the jurisdictional provision of section 214 indicates a congressional intent not
to have a private right of action under section 206. 77 Acknowledging that
other federal securities laws do have provisions expressly granting jurisdiction
over "actions at law," the dissent maintained that the omission of such a provi-
sion in section 214 provided no persuasive evidence of a legislative intent to
deny a private right of action, because section 214 is a jurisdictional rather
than a substantive provision.'" The Court itself previously had determined
that the source of implied rights of action must be found, not in the jurisdic-
tional provisions, but in the substantive provisions which they seek to en-
force.'" Thus, based upon its consideration of sections 214 and 215, the dis-
sent found that the Cort factor pertaining to evidence of legislative intent was
satisfied with respect to section 206. 80 Because it also determined that the
three remaining Cart factors were satisfied when applied to section 206, the
Lewis dissent expressed its view that an implied private cause of action for
damages under section 206 should be recognized."
71
 444 U.S. at 28 & 11.5 (White, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 29 (White, J., dissenting).
71 Id.
74 Id. According to the dissent, it also indicated that Congress did not intend
the powers given to the SEC to be the exclusive means for enforcement of the Act. ld.
75 Id. at '30. As the dissent mentioned, the Court in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228, 239 (1978), had recognized that the question whether a litigant has a right of
action is distinct from and prior to the question of what relief, if any, he may be able
to receive. Id. 444 U.S. at 30.
" 	 Id. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969)
("The existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appro-
priate remedies.").
" 444 U.S. at 31 (White, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 32-33 (White, J., dissenting).
7" Id. at 32 (White. J.. dissenting) (citing Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 577).
"" 444 U.S. at 28 & n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 36 (White, J., dissenting).
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The significance of Transamerica v. Lewis is twofold. First, the Lewis deci-
sion moves closer to a complete rejection of the four factor Cort test than any
prior Supreme Court decision. According to the Lewis Court, the determina-
tion of whether to imply a private cause of action should be based solely on a
restrictive application of the second Cart factor, which demands evidence of a
legislative intent to create or deny such an action. 82 If this aspect of the Cort
test is not met, it is irrelevant that the plaintiff satisfies the three remaining
portions of the Cort standard. This results in a test for implied causes of ac-
tion which is more stringent than any applied by the Court thus far. The
Lewis decision is also significant for its heavy reliance on the expressio maxim in
determining legislative intent. This maxim, the use of which increases the
strictness of the Lewis test, has been applied sparingly in the past." The em-
phasis, however, placed upon it in Lewis as well as in two other recent deci-
sions" appears to indicate a judicial trend towards greater utilization of this
principle when deciding implied rights of action cases. Use of this maxim in
future decisions will greatly limit, if not end, the implication of private rights
of action.
This casenote will first trace the history of implied rights of action from
the liberal test of .J.1. Case Co. v. Borak 85 to the more demanding standards set
by National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers
(Amtrak) 86 and Cort v. Ash." It will then consider the Court's dual approach
towards implied rights of action in the 1978 term—a liberal application of the
Cort test in the civil rights context and the use of an increasingly restrictive
test in the regulatory area. Subsequently, an analysis of the 1979 decision of
Transamerica v. Lewis will indicate that, at least in the realm of securities regu-
lation, the Court intends to maintain its strict attitude towards implied rem-
edies. This article will demonstrate that Lewis offers the most rigorous test of
any because it focuses solely on evidence of legislative intent and because it
utilizes the expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle in its search for this evi-
dence. It will be submitted that the Lewis test, which will deny the implication
of most private causes of action, should not be utilized, since there is substan-
tial justification for implying private rights of action notwithstanding the ab-
sence of facial legislative intent. In place of the Lewis test, a more liberal two
part test will be proposed.
I. THE HISTORY OF IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION
Although the implication doctrine originated in England in 1854," it was
not applied in the United States until 1916 in the Supreme Court decision of
82 444 U.S. at 24.
" See note 39 supra for a listing of certain prior cases using the expressio
maxim.
" Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 458; Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571-74.
85 377 U.S. 426 (1964),
414 U.S. 453 (1974).
" 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
88 Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854). In Couch, the plaintiff, who
had become ill while serving on one of the defendant's ships, alleged that he was
unable to recover from his sickness while at sea because of an insufficient supply of
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Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby." There, the Court implied a private cause of
action for an injured railroad employee under the Federal Safety Appliance
Act. 9 ° In so doing, the Rigsby Court observed that "[a] disregard of the com-
mand of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one
of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to
recover the damages from the party in default is implied ...."" In the years
following Rigsby, however, the creation of an implied private cause of action
was relatively unusual. 92
 Then in 1964, when J.I. Case Co. v. Barak" was
decided, the restrictive approach of the Supreme Court towards implied
rights of action was liberalized." It is therefore instructive to look at the
Borah test and the policy reason behind its formulation.
A. J.I. Case v. Borak and the Borak Test
In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,`'' a shareholder of Case Company brought an
action for recission of a consummated merger between Case Company and
the American Tractor Corporation, and for damages for himself and other
shareholders." The stockholder alleged a violation of section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934," 7 because, according to the stockholder, the
medicines on hoard the vessel. Id. at 1194. The statute under which the suit was
brought indicated that an adequate supply of medicines must be provided on each
ship, id., and that a violation of this law would incur a penalty. Id. at 1196. Although
the statute offered no express private remedy for damages, the court implied a private
remedy in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 1198.
" 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
4" In Rigsby, the railroad employee was injured because of his employer's fail-
ure to comply with the regulatory provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1976). This Act expressly provided only penal sanctions. See 45 U.S.C.
§ 6 (1976). While Rigsby is still cited in support of the implication of private remedies,
later cases have rejected the result of Rigsby under the Federal Safety Appliance Act.
See, e.g., Crane v. Cedar Rapids & 1.C. Ry., 395 U.S. 164 (1969); Moore v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
"' 241 U.S. at 39.
" 2 Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action from Federal Statutes: Amtrak and
Curt Apply the. Brakes, 17 B.C. INn. & Com. L. Rev. 53, 54 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Implying Priv. ate Causes of Action].
93
 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
94 See Implying Private Causes of Action, supra note 92, at 55.
95 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
96 Id. at 427.
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1964) provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, or otherwise to solicit or to permit the use of
his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any
security (other than an exempted security) registered on any national se-
curities exchange in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. The stockholder also alleged a violation of Rule 14(a)-9, Fed. Reg. 11434 (1952),
which read:
No solicition subject to §§ 240.14a-1, to 240.14a-10 shall be made by means
of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting, or other corn-
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merger was effectuated through circulation of a false and misleading proxy
statement by those proposing the merger."' Section I4(a), however, made no
specific reference to a private right of action; instead, it expressly provided
only prospective enforcement by the SEC.""
The Borak Court held that a private party has an implied right of action
for a violation of section 14(a). 10" The Court's principal reason for so ruling
was that granting such an implied right was essential to effectuate the . purpose
of the st2tutte. 11 ' The Court noted that under section 14(a) it was unlawful
for any person to solicit proxies in contravention of regulations prescribed by
the SEC as necessary in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors. 102 Consequently, the Borak Court saw investors as the prime intended
beneficiaries of the Act and their protection as one of its main purposes."'
The Court observed that because the SEC had to inspect over 2,000 proxy
statements annually, it admittedly had to accept most representations con-
tained in proxy material at their face value."' This meant that violations of
section 14(a) often would not be apparent to the Commission in its cursory
examination of the proxies and therefore would not be corrected. Con-
sequently, the Court saw implied private actions as a needed supplement to
action by the Commission if the purpose of section 14(a) was to be carried
out." To a much lesser extent, the Borak Court also relied on the fact that
state law might not provide the remedial relief necessary. The Court noted
that even if the law of the state did attach responsibility to the use of mislead-
ing proxy statements, the victim might still face insurmountable hurdles in a
state court, such as security for expenses statutes."'
Following this opinion, federal court decisions 107 extracted from J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak a three part test which was never stated explicitly in the Borak
opinion.'" According to this Borak-derived test, a private right of action may
munication written or oral containing any statement which at the time and
in the light. of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or mislead-
ing with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material
fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not. false or mislead-
ing or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication
with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject
matter which has become false or misleading.
Id.
"g 377 U.S. at 427.
"" Id. at 431.
Id. at 433. The complete Borak holding was that a private party has an im-
plied right of action for a violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and rule 14(a)-9.
lot Id
02 Id. at 431.
1113 Id,
104
 Id. at 432.
104 Id.
106 Id. at 434-35.
107 See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967);
Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviation, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970); Fagot
v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Stipp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969).
' 0N Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for
Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392, 1396 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Some Implications
for Implication].
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be implied when (1) the plaintiff falls within the zone of interest intended to
be protected by the statute; (2) the harm is of the type that, the statute was
intended to prevent; and (3) the express penalty or remedy is insufficient. to
effectuate the congressional purpose in passing the statute.'" Applying this
test, federal courts for a number of years liberally construed private rights of
action in many federal statutes."' In 1974, however, the era of the Barak
approach abruptly ended when the Supreme Court changed its attitude on
implied rights of action, and adopted a more stringent approach in National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak)'"
and Con v. Ash. " 2
B. Amtrak and Curt
Amtrak represents the Court's first modern usage of the expressio maxim in
denying an implied right of action. In that case, the National Association of
Railroad Passengers filed suit under the Rail Passengers Service Act of 1970
(Amtrak Act) 13 to enjoin the announced discontinuance of certain passenger
trains operated by Central of Georgia Railway Company."' Section 307(a) of
this Act, 15 however, confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to grant
equitable relief only on petition of the Attorney General or, if the case in-
volves a labor agreement, on petition of an affected railroad employee. 116
The question, therefore, was whether an implied right of action lay in favor
of railway passengers to prevent actions by Amtrak that were allegedly viola-
tive of its enabling statute." 7
The Court held that section 307(a) provides the exclusive remedies for
violations of the Amtrak Act, and that no additional private cause of action
209 Id .
hi. Sec note 107 suPra.
'" 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
"2 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
13 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1976).
".1
 414 U.S. at 454. The gravamen of the plaintiff's com plaint was that such
discontinuances were prohibited by the Amtrak Act. hi. at 454-55. Named as defen-
dants were Central; its parent, Southern Railway Company; and the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). Id. at 454.
15 Section 307(a), 45 U.S.C.	 547(a) (1976), provides:
If the Corporation or any railroad engages in or adheres to any action,
practice, or policy inconsistent with the policies and purposes of this chap-
ter, obstructs or interferes with any activities authorized by this chapter,
refuses, fails, or neglects to discharge its duties and responsibilities under
this chapter, or threatens any such violation, obstruction, interference, re-
fusal, failure, or neglect, the district court of the United States for any
district in which the Corporation or other person resides or may be found
shall have jurisdiction, except as otherwise prohibited by law, upon petition
of the Attorney General of the United States or, in a case involving a labor
agreement, upon petition of any employee affected thereby, including duly
authorized employee representatives, to grant such equitable relief as may
be necessary or appropriate to prevent or terminate any violation, conduct,
or threat.
Id.
"" 4l4 U.S. at 456-57.
" 7 Id. at 456.
1156	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:1143
can be inferred from the Act.'" In reaching its decision, the Amtrak Court
reasoned that the implication of a private right of action would have been
permissible only if such a finding were consistent with the legislative intent.
and would effectuate the purposes of the Amtrak Act.'" In considering legis-
lative intent the Court utilized the principle that when legislation expressly
provides a certain remedy or remedies, a court should not expand the cover-
age of the statute to subsume other remedies.'" This rule of statutory con-
struction, which later was to play a significant role in Transamerica v. Lewis,' 2 '
is an application of the expressio principle.'" In keeping with this principle,
the Amtrak Court noted that since section 307(a) expressly creates a private
cause of action limited to a case involving a labor agreement, the implication
of an additional private right of action would not be permissible.' 2" The
Court did concede that this rule of construction would yield to clear contrary
evidence of legislative intent, but the Court found no such evidence in Am-
trak. 124
After considering the legislative intent, the Amtrak Court focused on the
purpose of the Amtrak Act. The Court found that the Act was intended to
provide an efficient means by which Amtrak could eliminate unprofitable
routes without submitting to the time-consuming proceedings of state regula-
tory bodies or the Interstate Commerce Commission, as had been required
before the Act's passage.'" If, however, a private right of action were im-
plied here, the Act's goal of efficiency would be destroyed, because it would
indicate that the future withdrawal of uneconomic train routes would be
slowed by suits in the federal courts.' 2 "
The two factor analysis of the Amtrak Court, which included a determina-
tion of both statutory purpose and legislative intent, appears to be more re-
strictive than the test utilized in Borak. The Amtrak Court, like the Court in
Barak, considered whether such an implied right was needed to effectuate the
purpose of the statute.' 27 Unlike the Borak Court, however, the Amtrak Court
also sought to determine whether the implication of a private action was con-
sistent with legislative intent, and in so doing, utilized the expressio principle. It
is unlikely that a court will grant an implied remedy after application of the
expressio principle because according to this maxim, a court can deny a litigant
any implied remedies if even one express remedy is stated within the statute
at issue. Consequently, although the Amtrak Court did not indicate whether
satisfying only the "statutory purpose" factor would be sufficient for implying
"8 Id. at 464-65.
'' Id. at 457-58.
128 Id. at 458.
121 See text and notes at. notes 38-46 supra.
122
 414 U.S. at 458.
123 Id. at 460.
124 Id. at 458.
125 Id. at 463.
128 Id. at 463-64. Thus. unlike in Borak. the Amtrak Court found that the impli-
cation of a private right of action would hinder rather than further the legislative
scheme. Id.




a private cause of action, this omission should not obscure the fact that by
resurrecting the expressio maxim, the Amtrak Court rejected the liberal Borak
approach.' 28
 The use of the expressio principle indicated that the Amtrak
Court had moved a lengthy distance from Borak, where the focus had been on
the broad policy considerations underlying the statute,'" and where the
Court had been very willing to find an implied right of action in a federal
statute)" As a circuit court judge writing after Amtrak stated, the Amtrak
decision was a definite signal to the lower courts to limit their use of the
implication doctrine.' 31
One year after the Amtrak decision, the Court delivered its landmark de-
cision of Cort v. Ash, i 32
 where the Court reemphasized its more restrictive
approach towards implied rights of action by eliciting and narrowly applying a
four factor test. In Cort, a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel Corporation sought
damages from that corporation because of an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 610.' 33
 This criminal statute, which expressly provided only for a criminal
penalty, prohibited corporations from making an expenditure or contribution
in connection with any election in which votes were to be cast for presidential
and vice-presidential electors.'" The shareholder plaintiff contended that
128
 Note, Implication of Private Actions From Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, 1 J.
CORP. L. 371, 381 (1976) [hereinafter cited as From Borak to Ash].
12 " Sec text and notes at notes 100-05 supra. See also Note, The Implication of a
Private Cause of Action Under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 383, 410 (1974) thereinafter cited as Consumer Credit Protection Act].
' 3° From Borak to Ash, supra note 128, at 380.
' 3 ' Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 426-27 (3d . Cir. 1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
This court of appeals decision was later reversed in Cort. v. Ash, 422 U.S 66 (1975),
where the Court adopted the view of judge Aldisert.
132
 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
' 33 Id. at 71. When this suit was filed, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) provided in part
as follows:
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by
authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in
connection with any election to any political office, or in connection with
any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candi-
dates for any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor
organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or
Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Cbngress are
to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political
convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing
offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept
or receive any contribution prohibited by this section.
Every corporation or labor organization which makes any contribution
or expenditure in violation of this section shall he fined not more than
$5,000; and every officer or director of any corporation, or officer of any
labor organization, who consents to any contribution or expenditure by the
corporation or labor organization, as the case may be, and any person who
accepts or receives any contribution, in violation of this section, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both; and if the violation was willful, shall he fined not more than $10,000
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during the 1972 presidential election, the corporate directors of Bethlehem
had violated section 610 by authorizing political advertisements to be paid
from Bethlehem's general corporate funds for the presidential election cam-
paign.'
In Cort, the Court held that a private cause of action by a shareholder to
secure derivative damages would not be implied under section 610. 136
Rather, it ruled that relief was available, if at all, under state law.'" In decid-
ing not to imply a federal cause of action under section 610, the Court
considered a four factor approach, which was the approach later utilized by
the Lewis dissent,'" and which had been drawn from the tests of previous
implied rights cases.'" The first factor of the Cort analysis, where it had to be
determined if the plaintiff was one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute had been enacted, was essentially the standard used in Texas & Pacific
Railway v. Rigsby. ' 4 ° In applying this first factor in Cori, the Court indicated
that one must be a primary beneficiary in order to fall within the class of
intended plaintiffs."' The Court then noted that the protection of ordinary
shareholders was at best a secondary concern of the statute, since its primary
goal was to eliminate the apparent hold on political parties which business
interests sometimes obtained because of generous campaign contributions."'
Consequently, the Court held that the shareholder, not being a primary ben-
eficiary of the legislation at issue, had not satisfied this initial section of the
Cart analysis.' 43
The Court then moved to the second factor, which was drawn from one
of the two factors considered in Amtrak, and which was concerned with
whether there was any indication of explicit or implied legislative intent either
to create such a remedy or to deny one.' 44 The application of this second
factor by the Court in the con case differed from the manner in which the
Amtrak Court had applied it. In Amtrak the Court had relied almost solely on
the expressio maxim, which negates all remedies not expressly stated in the
' 35 422 U.S. at 70-71.
' 34' Id. at 85.
17 Id. The state law to which the Court referred was that of Delaware. Id. at
71.
"" See text and notes at notes 65-81 supra.
' 3 " 422 U.S. at 78.
"" 241 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1916). See text and notes at notes 89-91 supra for a brief
discussion of Rigsby.
' 4 ' 422 U.S. at 78.
142 Id. at 82. The Court viewed § 610 as being primarily concerned with corpo-
rations as a source of aggregated wealth and thus of possibly corrupting influence, and
not directly concerned with the internal relations between the corporations and their
shareholders. Id. In contrast, the Court noted that in those situations where it had
inferred a federal private cause of action, there had generally been a clearly articu-
lated federal right in the plaintiff, see, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or a pervasive legislative scheme
ruling the relationship between the plaintiff class and the defendant class in a particu-
lar respect, see, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 422 U.S. at 82.
' 43 Id. at 81-82.
' 44 Id. at 78.
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statute, in order to decide if an implied right of action was consistent. with the
legislative intent.' 4 '' In Cart, by contrast, the Court did not apply this rule of
statutory construction.'" In its discussion of the second factor, the Court
noted that if a plaintiff was a primary beneficiary of the statute—that is, if he
clearly fell within the class to whom the federal law had granted certain
rights—he need not show a legislative intent to create a cause of action, al-
though an explicit legislative intent to deny such a cause of action would be
controlling.' 47 In Cort, however, the plaintiff had not been found to be a
primary beneficiary under the statute.'" Therefore, in such a situation, the
lack of any suggestion in the legislative history that section 610 may give rise
to a suit for damages, or to any civil cause of action, reinforced the Court's
conclusion that the legislative expectation, if any, was that such an offense
would be entrusted to state rather than federal law.' 4 •
Turning to the third factor of the test, the Court in Cori asked whether
an implied right of action in favor of the plaintiff would be consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.'" This aspect of the test
bears a great similarity to the Borak standard, permitting "such remedies as
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." 151 Unlike Borak,
however, the Court in Cort required that the implied action be consistent. with
the prima?), purpose, rather than any purpose, of the statute. 12 The Court
viewed the primary purpose of the statute as the destruction of the influence
over elections which corporations exercised through financial contributions. 15'
The Court decided that the recovery of the derivative damages sought here
would not cure the corporate influence over elections.' 54 Instead, such a
remedy would permit corporate directors to "borrow" corporate funds for a
time, and the compelled "repayment" at a later date might well not deter the
violation.' 55 Consequently, the implied right of action sought. by the
shareholder in Cort would not aid the primary statutory purpose and thus did
not meet the third part of the test.'"
The fourth and final prong of the Cort test considered whether the cause
of action was one traditionally relegated to state law in an area which was
fundamentally the concern of the states.'" In applying this portion of the
test, which had also been utilized in Borak,' 58 the Court in Cart found that it
was entirely appropriate to relegate the shareholder plaintiff here to whatever
"5 414 U.S. at 458.
14 " 422 U.S. at 82 n.14.
"7 422 U.S. al 82.
148 Id. at 81.
'4" Id. at 82-84.
'5" Id. at 78.
15t See Borak, 377 U.S. at 433.
152 422 U.S. at 84.
' 55 Id. at 80.
"4 Id. at 84.
' 55 Id.
1511 Id.
157 Id. at 78.
377 U.S. at 434-35.
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remedy state law had created. 16° - Viewing his claim as a violation of the direc-
tor's fiduciary duty to the corporation, the Court reasoned that corporations
are creatures of state law and that shareholders invest in the corporation with
the understanding that state law will govern the internal affairs of the corpo-
ration.' 6° After its analysis of the fourth factor, the Court in Cart ruled that
since the plaintiff had not satisfied any of the four parts of the test, a private
right of action for damages against corporate directors would not be implied
under section 610.' 6 '
The Cort test was capable of either a liberal or a strict interpretation,
because of the general terms in which it was phrased and because of the
Court's failure to assign relative weights to each factor of the test. Yet
throughout the opinion, the Court demonstrated that it favored a very strict
construction of each portion of this test for implied rights of action. For
example, it. interpreted "beneficiary" in the first part of the test to refer only
to a primary beneficiary.' 62 In addition, it construed "purpose" in the third
part as indicating only a primary purpose and not a secondary concern, in
contrast to the Borah approach.' 63 The strict interpretation of the Supreme
Court in Cart is also evidenced by the fact that the court of appeals, applying
much the same test, found that the plaintiff was a member of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, and that it would be appro-
priate, in light of the statute's purposes, to afford the plaintiff the remedy
sought."'" The Court's strict interpretation of a demanding four part test
indicates that the intent of Cart was like that of Amtrak, even though the
former did not create a presumption against implication by use of the expressio
principle. The aim of both cases was to slow the rapid proliferation of implied
rights of action.' 65 This goal of Cort and Amtrak, however, remained unful-
filled when in the four years following Cort, at least twenty court of appeals
decisions implied private rights of action from federal statutes.' 66
"" 422 U.S. at 84.
"" hi. The Court distinguished the Cori situation from that of Barak. Id. at 85.
The Court noted that in Barak, the whole purpose of the statute at issue would have
been defeated if no federal right of action had been implied and if state law had
provided no remedy. Id. In contrast, in enacting § 610, Congress was not concerned
with regulating corporations but with lessening their impact on federal presidential
elections. Id. The absence of a derivative cause of action for damages thus would not
hinder the primary statutory goal. Id.
Id.
162 Id. at 80.
1 f 3 Id. at 84.
'" See Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 422-24 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 66
(1975); Implying Private Causes of Action, supra note 92, at 64.
165 Implying Private Causes of Action, supra note 92, at 64.
'" Some of these lower court decisions are: Local Div. No. 714, Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978) (§ 13c of
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964); Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223 (7th Cir.
1978), vacated and remanded, 443 U.S. 903 (1979) (§ 1007a of Federal Aviation Act of
1958); Wilson v. First Houston Investment Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978), va-
cated and remanded, 444 U.S. 959 (1979) (§ 206 of Investment Advisers Act of 1940);
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd.,
568 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1977) (§ lie of Federal Home Loan Bank Act); Abrahamson v.
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C. The 1978 T 	  Cannon and Touche Ross
In its 1978 Term, the United States Supreme Court handed down two
implied rights decisions in which it reached opposite results—Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago ' s ' and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.'" Through these
cases, the Court seemed to demonstrate that instead of using a universal
Amtrak —or Cort — based approach to implied rights of action, it was setting
rules for implied remedies in the area of civil rights legislation different from
those in the field of securities regulation. Thus, while the Court followed a
liberal interpretation of the Cart analysis in creating an implied remedy in
Cannon, it decreased its emphasis of the Cart analysis and relied heavily on the
expressio maxim of Amtrak in denying an implied right of action in Touche Ross.
This section will concentrate on the Cannon and Touche Ross decisions before
this article further considers the Lewis case, where it became obvious that the
approach of Cori and Cannon would not be utilized in the securities area.
In Cannon, the plaintiff was a female who had been denied admission to
the medical schools of two private universities.'" In a civil rights suit brought
under section 901(a) 10 of Title IX of the Education Amendment Acts of
1972,' 7 ' she charged the schools with discriminating against her on the basis
of sex. 172 Title IX, however, which prohibits sex discrimination by universities
receiving federal financial assistance, does not expressly authorize any private
right of action.' 73 Yet the Cannon Court held that the plaintiff had the right
Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (§ 206 of
Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
167 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
168
 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
169 441 U.S. at 680. The two private universities were the University of Chicago
and Northwestern University. Id. at 680 n.1,
' 7° 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). Section 901(a), in relevant part, provides: "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...." Id.
' 7 ' 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
172 441 U.S. at 680. Plaintiff's complaints allege that the plaintiff was qualified
to attend both of the defendant medical schools based on objective (i.e., test scores and
grade point average) and subjective criteria. Id. at 680-81 n.2. Both schools admitted
some persons to the classes to which she had applied despite the fact that such per-
sons' objective qualifications were less impressive than those of the plaintiff. Id. It was
also noted that both schools have policies against accepting applicants more than 30
years old, at least if they do not have advanced degrees, and petitioner was 39 years
old when she applied. Id. The plaintiff alleged that these policies prevented her from
being asked to interview at the medical schools, so that she did not have the opportu-
nity to convince the schools that her personal qualifications warranted her admis-
sion instead of the admission of persons whose objective qualifications were better than
hers. Id. Because the incidence of interrupted higher education is greater among
women than men, the plaintiff further claimed that the age and advanced degree
criteria operate to exclude women from being considered, even though such criteria
are not valid predictors of success in medical schools or medical practice. Id. Thus,
according to the plaintiff, the existence of the criteria evidenced a violation of the
medical school's duty under Title IX to avoid discrimination on the basis of sex. Id.
173 441 U.S. at 683. Rather, Title IX establishes a procedure for the termination
of federal financial support by the federal government for educational institutions
which violate section 901. Id. Because the defendant universities were receiving federal
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to pursue, under Title IX, a private cause of action against the universities.' 74
In reaching its decision, the Court applied each part of the Cart test to
the facts in Cannon. 175 R found, in considering the first part of the Cart test,
that Title IX explicitly conferred a benefit on persons discriminated against
by educational institutions on the basis of sex, and that the female plaintiff
was clearly a member of that especially benefited class.' 78 Analyzing the sec-
ond factor without any reference to the expressio maxim, the Cannon Court
noted that since it was clear that federal law had granted a class of persons,
including the plaintiff, certain rights, it need not find evidence of a congres-
sional intent to create a private cause of action, although evidence of an
explicit intent to deny such a cause of action would be controlling.'"
Nevertheless, the Court spent much time in demonstrating, through legislative
history, that Title IX did show a legislative intent to create such a remedy.'"
It mentioned that Title IX had been patterned after Tide VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,' 7 " which prohibits racial discrimination in federally
funded programs.'" When Title IX was enacted, Title VI had already been
interpreted as creating a private remedy,'"' and the Cannon Court found
through legislative history that the drafters of Title IX had assumed that it
would be interpreted and applied just as Title VI had been.'" Hence, the
Cannon Court had no doubt that Congress intended to create a private rem-
edy in Title- IX comparable to that in Title V1.' 83 .
After finding that an implied right of action here would satisfy the sec-
ond Coil factor, the Cannon Court focused on the third factor, which was
concerned with whether an implied private remedy would frustrate the un-
derlying purpose of the legislative scheme.'" Here the Court stated that one
funds, they were subject to the strictures of Title IX. 441 U.S. at 680. See note 170
supra for the relevant portion of Tide IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
' 70. 441 U.S. at 688-89.
175 Id. at 689.
178 Id. at 693-94.
177 Id. at 694.
178 Id. at 702-03.
"" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1976).
'HD 441 U.S. at 696. Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." Id.
'"' 44! U.S. at 696. Among the decisions which construed Title Vi as creating a
private remedy are: Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing
Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (W.D. Tex. 1972); Hawthorne v. Kenbridgc Recrea-
tion Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 1382, 1383-84 (E.D. Va. 1972).
"2 441 U.S. at 696-98. According to Senator Bayh, "'the same [enforcement]
procedure that was set up and has operated with great success under the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, and the regulations thereunder[,] would be equally applicable to discrimi-
nation [prohibited by Title IX): " Id. at 696 n.19 (quoting 117 CoNG. REc. 30408
(1971)).
183
 441 U.S. at 703.
184 Id.
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of the goals of Title IX was to provide individual citizens with effective pro-
tection against the discriminatory practices of universities receiving federal
funding.'" The Court reasoned that. this goal was best met through the
award of relief to the private litigant who has been injured by the discrimina-
tion.'" The Court then turned to the fourth Cart inquiry, which questioned
whether implying a federal remedy was inappropriate because the subject
matter involved an area of concern to the states. It determined that like the
other three factors, the fourth Cori factor was satisfied by the Cannon fact
situation.'"' In justifying this finding the Court noted that since the Civil
War, the federal government and the federal courts had been the primary
means of protecting citizens against invidious discrimination.'" Moreover,
the Court observed that it was the expenditure of federal funds that justified
this particular statutory prohibition.'" Consequently, the Court held that
without doubt, this aspect of the Con/ analysis supported the implication of a
private federal remedy.'" In summary, the Court concluded that there was
no need to weigh the four Cort factors because each supported the same re-
sult, namely, that a private cause of action should be granted victims of dis-
crimination under Title IX.' 9 '
The Cannon result would not have been reached if the Court had used
the expressio maxim it had applied in Amtrak and was later to apply in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington 1 " 2 and Transamerica v. Lewis.'• According to the ex-
pressio principle, the legislature is considered not to have intended a remedy
in the provision at issue if other parts of the statute expressly provide other
remedies. In Cannon, it was noted that Title IX does expressly offer a remedy
in section 902, 194
 which establishes a procedure for termination of federal
financial support by the relevant federal department or agency to institutions
violating the statute."' Yet, in contrast to the mandate of the expressio princi-
ple, the Cannon Court still implied a private cause of action under Title IX.' 98
The Court's failure to use the expressio maxim and the lenient approach which
resulted can first be explained by a consideration of the great similarity exist-
ing between Title IX and Title VI.'" The two statutes use identical language
to describe the benefited class, except for the use of the word "sex" in Title
185 Id. at 704. The Cannon Court observed that the other goal of Title IX was to
avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices. Id. According to
the Court, this goal generally was served by the statutory procedure for the termina-
tion of federal financial support for institutions engaged in discriminatory practices.
Id. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
r" 441 U.S. at 705-06.
187 Id. at 708-09.
"" Id. at 708.
' tl 11 hi. at 708-09.
'"" Id. at 709.
oil Id.
"2
 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
"" 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
14
 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
"5
 441 U.S. at 683-84.
196
 Id. at 717.
'"7 See note 180 supra for the text of § 601 of Title VI.
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IX in place of the words "race, color, or national origin" in Title VI,'" and
the legislative history indicates that both were intended to be interpreted and
applied in the same way.'"" Therefore, the Cannon Court assumed that since
Title VI had already been construed as creating a private right of action, so
too should Title IX. 2"
Although not explicitly stated, another explanation for the Cannon
Court's more liberal attitude and failure to apply the expressio maxim is that in
suits involving civil rights legislation, the Court prefers not to engage in the
more stringent tests which it later used in Touche Ross and Lewis because of
the importance of the right involved. Therefore, in retrospect it appears that
because of both the unique legislative history and the nature of the claim,
Cannon is an exception to the general trend towards an extremely restrictive
approach to implied rights of action.
The Cannon decision was soon followed by Touche Ross & Co. v. Red-
ington, 20" in which the Court, retreating from the less stringent Cannon ap-
proach and its application of the four factor Cori analysis, revealed a highly
restrictive attitude towards implied rights of action. In Touche Ross, the Se-
curities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) and the trustee of Weis, a
securities brokerage firm, filed suit under section 17(a) 202 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 against Touche Ross, an accounting firm. 203 The
plaintiffs sought to impose liability on Touche Ross because of its allegedly
improper audit and certification of the 1972 Weis financial statements filed
1 " 0 441 U.S. at 694-95.
1 " 9 Id. at 703. See note 182 supra.
20" 441 U.S. at 703. The Cannon Court stated:
It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like
other citizens, know the law; in this case, because of their repeated refer-
ences to Title VI and its modes of enforcement, we are especially justified
in presuming both that those representatives were aware of the prior in-
terpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflects their intent.
with respect to Title IX.
Id. at 696-98.
201 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
202 Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78q(a) (1970)), read as
follows:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every
broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium
of any such member, every registered securities association, and every
broker or dealer registered pursuant to section 78o of this title, shall make,
keep, and preserve for such periods, such accounts, correspondence,
memoranda, papers, books, and other records, and make such reports, as
the Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. Such
accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other records
shall be subject at any time or from time to time to such reasonable
periodic, special, or other examinations by examiners or other representa-
tives of the Commission as the Commission may deem necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.




 Section 17(a), which did not explicitly provide for any pri-
vate right of action, required broker-dealers and others to keep such records
and file such reports as the SEC prescribed.'"
The Touche Ross Court held that section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 did not create an implied cause of action in favor of the custom-
ers of Weis, here represented by plaintiffs SIPC and the trustee. 2 "6 In ex-
plaining its decision, the Touche Ross Court emphasized, as would the Lewis
Court, that its task was limited solely to determining whether Congress in-
tended to create the private right of action here asserted,'" In attempting to
make this determination, the Touche Ross Court first noted that section 17(a)
104 Id. at 565-66. In Touche Ross, the defendant accounting firm, Touche Ross,
had been retained by a securities brokerage firm, Weis Securities Inc., a broker-dealer
registered with the SEC. Id. at 563. From 1969 to 1973, Touche Ross conducted audits
of Weis' financial condition required by section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and
rules promulgated thereunder. Id. at 563-64. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1979). In 1973,
because of Weis' precarious financial condition and because of possible violations of
the 1934 Act by Weis and its officers, the SEC was granted an injunction barring Weis
and five of its officers from continuing to conduct business in violation of the 1934
Act. Id. at 564. Simultaneously, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) a decree ad-
judging that. Weis' customers were in need of the protection afforded by the Securities
Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-7811/ (1976). Id. The general protection
offered by the Act. included SIPC's compensating, up to certain limits, customers of
brokerage firms who incurred losses from broker insolvencies. Id. at 564-65 n.5. In
Touche Ross, because Weis' cash and securities during the liquidation appeared insuffi-
cient to make whole its customers, SIPC advanced the plaintiff Redington, the court-
appointed trustee, $14 million to satisfy Weis' customer and credit claims. Id. at 565.
Yet there still remained several million dollars of unsatisfied customer claims.
Therefore SIPC and the trustee Redington filed a suit against Touche Ross under
section 17(a) of the 1934 Act. Id. The trustee sought $51 million on behalf of Weis
and the customers of Weis, while S1PC claimed $14 million either as subrogee of Weis'
customers or in its own right. Id. at 566.
205 Id. at 569. At the time Touche Ross performed the auditing services for
Weis, rule 17a-5, 17C.F.R. §§ 240.1 7a-5(a), (h) (1972), required Weis to file an annual
report of its financial condition, which included a certificate by an independent public
accountant stating "'clearly the opinion of the accountant with respect to the financial
statement covered by the certificate and the accounting principles and practices re-
flected therein.'" 442 U.S. at 563-64 n.3 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240,17a-5(a), (h) (1972)).
In addition, the rule required the accountant's certificate to contain a
reasonably comprehensive statement as to the scope of the audit made,
including a statement as to whether the accountant received the procedures
followed for safeguarding the securities or customers, ... whether the
audit was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
applicable in the circumstances [and] ... whether the audit made omitted
any procedure deemed necessary by the accountant. under the cir-
cumstances of the particular case.
442 U.S. at 563-64 n.3 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(g)(2) (1972)). Weis also was
required to attach an affirmation or oath to the report that the financial statements
were true and correct. 442 U.S. at 563-64 n.3 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(14(2)
(1972)). Since 1972, the Securities Exchange Commission has amended rule 17a-5. 442
U.S. at 563-64 n.3. See 17 C.F.R. § 240-17a-5 (1979).
2" 442 U.S. at 576.
207
 Id. at 568.
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by its terms neither conferred rights on private parties nor proscribed any
conduct as unlawfu1. 2" This indicated that section I7(a) did not have private
parties, such as the plaintiffs here, as its primary beneficiaries. As the Court
observed, section I7(a) was enacted to provide regulatory authorities with the
necessary information to enforce various statutes. 20" Subsequently, the Touche
Ross Court pointed out that the legislative history of the 1934 Act was totally
silent on whether a private right should be available under section 17(a) in the
circumstances of this case:2 " Then, in what appeared to be a revival of the
expressio maxim utilized in Amtrak, the Court focused most of its attention on
the fact that provisions of the 1934 Act other than section I7(a) explicitly
authorized certain private causes of action not available to the Touche Ross
plaintiffs. 2 " The Court made particular reference to section I8(a), which
created an express right against persons such as accountants who caused
materially misleading statements to be made in reports filed with the Commis-
s;011. 212
 As noted by the Court, the cause of action stated in section 18(a) was
"8
 Id. at 569.
20" Id. The Court noted that reports filed in accordance with § 17a, along with
inspections and other information, enable the Commission and the Exchange to ensure
compliance with the "net capital rule," which is the chief regulatory tool by which the
Exchange and the Commission monitor the financial wellbeing of brokerage firms and
protect customers from the risks involved in leaving their securities and cash with
broker-dealers. Id. at 570 & n.10. According to the Court, the information within the §
17(a) reports is intended to provide the Commission, the Exchange, and other au-
thorities with enough warning to allow them to take appropriate action to protect in-
vestors before the financial collapse of the broker-dealer involved. Id. But the Touche
Court maintained that § I 7(a) does not purport to confer private damage rights or any
remedy in the event that the regulatory authorities are not. successful in achieving their
objectives and the broker becomes insolvent before corrective measures can be taken.
Id. at 570.
21" Id. at 571.
211 Id. at 571-74. Provisions of the 1934 Act providing private remedies include:
§ 16b, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); § 18a, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976); and § 9e, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i(e) (1976).
212 442 U.S. at 572-74. Section 18(a), as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976),
provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any
application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule
or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration
statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, which
statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact,
shall he liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or
misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or
sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for dam-
ages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court
may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs
of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys'





limited to persons who, in reliance on an accountant's statements, bought or
sold a security whose price was affected by the statements. 2 " Since SIPC and
the Trustee Rechngton did not contend that Weis' customers bought or sold
securities in reliance on the section I7(a) reports at issue, they could not sue
Touche Ross under section 18(a). 214 The Court stated that because sections
17(a) and 18(a) were created contemporaneously, it was extremely reluctant to
imply a cause of action under section 17(a) which would be much broader
than the one expressly provided by Congress in section 18(a).215 Apparently,
to the Touche Ross Court, such an implied remedy under section 1 7(a) in favor
of the plaintiffs would have been contrary to legislative intent.
After discussing the relationship between sections 17(a) and 18(a), the
Court turned its attention to the plaintiffs' contention that the third and
fourth Cort factors, pertaining to the effectuation of the statutory purpose
and the relegation of the matter to state law, be considered. 216 The Touche
Ross Court concluded that once the question whether Congress intended to
create a private right of action had been answered in the negative, as here,
such factors had no relevance to the implication inquiry. 2 "
The Touche Ross opinion seemed to indicate that, in general, a private
right of action will not be implied in a securities case (1) where the plaintiff is
not the primary beneficiary under the statute, and (2) where an application of
the expressio principle indicates that Congress did not intend to creat the pri-
vate right of action asserted. The Touche Ross approach was a repudiation of
the Borak analysis because it failed to consider whether an implied right of
action would further the statutory purpose. In addition, the Touche Ross test
was an indication of a movement of the Court away from the four factor Cort
test. In Cort, each prong of the four part test for implied rights of action was
applied to the facts. 21 " In Touche Ross, the focus was only on the first two
factors, which considered the benefited class and evidence of legislative intent,
and the Court found the second factor to be the determinative one in decid-
ing whether to imply a private right of action. 211 '
In departing from the Borak approach and the four factor Cort test, the
Touche Ross Court significantly adopted a much more restrictive attitude to-
wards implied rights of action than Cannon or other prior cases. This attitude
is indicated first by the Touche Ross Court's great dependence on the expressio
maxim, which creates a presumption against implication by requiring that the
remedies expressly provided in a statute be the exclusive ones."" This prin-
ciple had been utilized previously in Amtrak but was not applied in Borak or
Curt. Although the Touche Ross Court. never expressly referred to this maxim,
the Court's reliance on it was obvious from its refusal to imply a private
213 442 U.S. at 574.
214 Id.
215 Id .
2111 Id. at 575.
217 Id. at 576
218
 422 U.S. at 78-85.
21 " 442 U.S. at 576.
2211 See From Borak to Ash, supra note 128, at 381; Implying Private Causes of Action,
supra note 92, at 68.
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remedy under section 1 7(a) because one had been explicitly provided under
section 18(a) of the Act. 221
The restrictive nature of the Touche. Ross test, in contrast to that of Cart, is
also indicated by the Court's refusal to apply two Cort factors which were
much easier to satisfy than the factor relating to evidence of legislative intent,
which the Touche Ross Court had seen as key to its decision. These two Omit-
ted factors include the third part of the Cori test, which focused on statutory
purpose and which was the basis of the Barak test, and the fourth part, which
considered the appropriateness of relegating the matter to state law. In Touche
Ross, these two factors would have been satisfied if applied, even though the
factor considering evidence of legislative intent was not. satisfied. As the
Touche Ross dissent noted in discussing the third Cart factor, a cause of action
would have been consistent with the underlying purposes of the 1934 Act.
because the SEC, lacking sufficient resources to audit all broker's documents,
had to rely on certification by accountants. 222 Thus, implying a private cause
of action would have both facilitated the SEC's enforcement efforts and pro-
vided an incentive for accountants to perform their certification Functions
correctly. 22 " The fourth Cart factor, regarding the appropriateness of relegat-
ing the matter to state law, would also have been satisfied in Touche Ross be-
cause, as the Touche. Ross dissent stated, the enforcement of the 1934 Act's
reporting provisions was not a matter of traditional state concern, but instead
related solely to the effectiveness of federal statutory requirements. 224 Fur-
thermore, "since the problems caused by broker insolvency are national in
scope, so too must. be the standards governing financial disclosure." 225 Yet.
the Touche Ross Court still chose to disregard the third and fourth Cori fac-
tors. Therefore, the Touche Ross Court moved a great distance from the Borak
approach and the Cori analysis and much closer to an overly stringent stan-
dard for implied rights of action, under which the expressio maxim was relied
upon heavily and the third and fourth factors of the Cart test were not even
considered.
After the conflicting decisions of Cannon and Touche Ross, the future at-
titude of the Supreme Court in implying rights of action could not be pre-
dicted with certainty. Cannon, in a liberal application of the Cori test, had
implied a private cause of action in the civil rights area, while Touche Ross,
through an analysis more restrictive than that of Cart, refused to create an
implied remedy in the securities field. Although it seemed likely after Touche
Ross that the Cannon approach would not be extended to the securities area,
confirmation of this opinion came only with the Lewis decision. The overly
strict approach of Lewis left no doubt that the Court intended to proceed
along the lines of Touche Ross rather than Cannon in determining whether to
imply a private right of action in the field of securities regulation.
" 1 442 U.S. at 574.
222 Id. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
at 432: Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969).
2" 442 U.S. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 582-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"5 Id. at 583 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,




II. THE LEWIS TEST AND THE FUTURE OF
IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION
A. What Lewis Adds to Prior Law
When the Court in Transamerica v. Lewis 22 " intensified the narrow ap-
proach of Touche Ross by holding that a private right of action could not be
implied under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 227 it based its deci-
sion solely on a restrictive interpretation of the second Cori factor, namely,
that the language, structure, and legislative history of the statute served as
evidence of a legislative intent not to create the private right of action as-
serted. 22 ' The Court indicated that once such evidence was established, it did
not matter if the plaintiff fulfilled the first Curt factor by being a member of
the class especially benefited by the statute."" In addition, the Lewis Court
viewed the third Cori factor, which had been emphasized in Borak, as insig-
nificant in arriving at its holding, and failed even to mention the fourth factor
of the Curt analysis. 2 "" Thus, Lewis represents the first. time the Supreme
Court has reached an implied right of action decision by using only one of the
Cort factors.
Touche Ross is similar to Lewis in that it focused chiefly on the second Curt
factor and omitted any consideration of the third and fourth factors, In
Touche Ross, however, unlike in Lewis, the first Curt inquiry could not be
answered in the affirmative. The Touche Ross Court specifically noted that
section 17(a) of the 1934 Act., 23 ' the statutory provision at issue, granted no
private rights to any identifiable class and proscribed no conduct as unlaw-
ful.'" Consequently, the initial section of the Curt analysis, asking whether-
the plaintiff was a member of the class benefited by the statute, had to be
answered in the negative, since section 17(a) created no class of which the
plaintiff could be a member. 233 Thus the decision in Touche Ross not to imply
a private remedy actually was founded on a consideration not only of the
second Curt factor but also of the first. In contrast, the Lewis Court conceded
that section 206 was intended to benefit the clients of investment advisers.'"
Therefore, the initial factor of Curt was passed because the plaintiff in Lewis,
since he represented such a client, Mortgage Trust of America, did fall within
the primary class to he benefited by the statute. Yet the Lewis Court still re-
fused to imply a private right of action, even though the first Curt factor was
satisfied, because it found no evidence of positive legislative intent to create a
private cause of action. Thus the Lewis Court went even further than Touche
Ross in its disregard of the Cort test and Borak principles, and made it even
more difficult. for a court to utilize the implication doctrine.
228
 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
227
 15 U.S.C.	 801)-(i (1976).
228 444 U.S. at 20-22.
22" Id. at 23.
23 ° Id. at 24.
23 ' 15 U.S.C. 78q(a) (1970).
232 442 U.S. at 569.
233 Id. at 570-71.
233 444 U.S. at 24.
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In addition to setting forth an approach to implied rights of action which
deemphasized Cori and Barak by focusing only on legislative intent, the Lewis
decision is also significant for its use of the expressio principle to an even
greater degree than the Touche Ross Court. Paraphrasing the expressio maxim,
the Lewis Court noted that where a statute explicitly provides a particular
remedy or remedies, the court must be chary of reading others into 4. 235
The Court then proceeded to apply this principle in such a manner as to
reduce substantially the likelihood of finding a legislative intent to create a
private cause of action. The Touche Ross Court had looked only to other sec-
tions of the 1934 Act, such as sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18(a), to find express
remedies.'" The Lewis Court initially did the same by considering sections
203, 209, and 217 of the Investment Advisers Act, which together provided
both judicial and administrative means for enfbrcing compliance with section
206.237
 The Lewis Court noted that in view of these express provisions for
enforcing section 206, it was unlikely that Congress had forgotten to mention
an intended private action. 238
 In contrast to the Touche Ross approach, how-
ever, the Lewis Court. continued this aspect of its analysis by looking beyond
the Investment Advisers Act. It considered provisions of the securities laws
preceding the Act as well as a provision of the Investment Company Act,
enacted as companion legislation to the Investment Advisers Act. 2 • Finding
that each of these statutes expressly authorized certain limited private suits for
damages, the Court concluded that the absence of such provisions for dam-
ages in section 206 further suggested that Congress was unwilling to impose
any potential monetary liability on a private suitor. 2 '10
 Such a conclusion
suggests that even if there are no express remedies in the statute in question,
the Court will find them in related statutes and then apply the expressio prin-
ciple.
Consequently, the contribution of the Lewis decision to the law is that it
provides an even more restrictive approach than Touche Ross by focusing
solely on evidence of legislative intent in implying private remedies. In addi-
tion, it increases the Court's reliance on the expressio maxim, already seen in
Touche Ross. Thus Lewis confirms that the more liberal Cort-based analysis of
Cannon will not be extended to the securities field. In the area of securities
regulation, Lewis appears to complete what Touche Ross did not quite finish—a
total reversal of the Court's attitude since the era of the less stringent stan-
dards of Borah and Cost.
23 5 Id. at 19.
2343
 442 U.S. at 571-74.
231 444 U.S. at 20.
238 Id.
2" Id. at 20-21. Among the statutory provisions in which Congress expressly
authorized private suits for damages under prescribed circumstances are § 11 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976); § 18 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976); § 30(f) of the Investment Company Act,
15 U.S.C. § 180a-29f (1976).
"" 444 U.S. at 21.
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B. A justification of Implied Rights of Action
The overly restrictive approach of the Lewis Court towards implied rights
of action is unpersuasive when one considers that the implication of remedies
from federal statutes is not only a permissible, but also a necessary, function
of the judiciary." 41 Implication can be justified as a permissible judicial task
first because in implying causes of action the courts are not. usurping legisla-
tive power by creating new laws; rather, they arc merely providing assistance
in enforcing the standards of conduct previously defined in the statute by
Congress. 2' 2 For example, the standard set by Congress in section I4(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act was that proxies could be sent only if they were
in accordance with the rules of the Securities Exchange Commission. 7 • By
holding that a private party could bring suit for a violation of section 14(a)
the Court in Borak was not providing a new or altered standard, for after
Barak, adherence to the SEC rules with respect to proxies still was required.
Instead, the Borak Court was aiding Congress by ensuring the effectiveness of
the standard which Congress itself had already enacted—Section 14(a). Thus,
contrary to the arguments of implication opponents, 244 implied rights of ac-
tion do not appear to constitute legislation by the courts.
Two factors lend support to the view that judicial implication does not
usurp legislative powers. The first of these factors is that the Court, especially
in Cart and the cases following Con, actually demonstrated great deference to
legislative intent L4 ` in deciding whether to imply private remedies. For exam-
ple, in Cart, one of the four parts of the Court's proposed test was devoted
solely to determining whether there was any evidence of legislative intent
either to deny or to create the cause of action there sought. Moreover, in the
years after Cart, this factor pertaining to evidence of legislative intent assumed
increasing importance until in Lewis it. was the sole consideration in the
"' In keeping with this idea, one commentator noted that "effective Con-
stitutionalism requires recognition of power in the federal courts to declare, as a mat-
ter of common law or 'judicial legislation,' rules which may be necessary to fill in
interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory patients enacted in the large by Con-
gress." Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice
of National and Slate Rules JO?. Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957).
242 From Borak to Ash., supra note 128, at. 374; see generally Note, Implying Civil
Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. Rev. 285, 291-92 (1963).
243 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (197(i), the text of which can be found at note 97
supra.
244 Among the anti-implication arguments is that of Chief justice Burger, who
in his dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411-12 (1971), stated:
I dissent from today's holding which judicially creates a damage remedy
not provided for by the Constitution and not enacted by Congress. We
would more surely preserve the important values of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers—and perhaps get a better result—by recommending a so-
lution to the Congress as the branch of government in which the Constitu-
tion has vested the legislative power. Legislation is the business of the Con-
gress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task—as we do not.
Id.
"5 See Implying Private Causes of Action, supra note 92, at 67.
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Court's decision not to imply a private remedy. Because the Court. could find
no evidence in the language or legislative history of section 206 that the legis-
lature had intended to create a private cause of action for the clients of in-
vestment advisers. it refused to imply one.'" A second factor supporting the
belief that the judiciary is not infringing upon legislative ground by implying
private remedies is that, as stated by the Ninth Circuit, Congress initially has
the opportunity to prevent judicial implication in an enforcement scheme
which it wants to he exclusive by denying any private actions in the language
of the original statute. 247 Where Congress offers such it pronouncement re-
garding remedies, then it seems obvious a court. would not consider implica-
tion. Where Congress, however, does not offer such clear statements of its
intent., it would seem that Congress expects the judiciary to assume the func-
tion of implying the remedies necessary to enforce the statute.'"
Implication can be justified as a permissible judicial functi(m not only
because it does not intrude on the legislative sphere but also because the
courts have jurisdiction to entertain such suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a),
which allows the district courts to have original jurisdiction over a matter
which "arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. " 249
As the Supreme Court in Bell V. Hood '' " noted:
24 " 444 U.S. at 24.
247
 Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1974). In keeping
with this view, it can he argued that under the system of checks and balances Congress
should feel free to revise what the judiciary has clone if the former decides the latter
has acted erroneously. Consumer Credit Prolection Aci, supra note 129, at 414. An illustra-
tion of this process can be found by analyzing the history of sections 216 (c) and 217
of the Lair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217 (1952):
liefOre Congress added subdivision (c) to
	 16 and the proviso to § 17 in
1949, the Second Circuit had held ... that a District Court, acting under
its unrestricted general equity powers, had jurisdiction, in a suit brought by
the Secretary under § 17 of the Act as it then stood. to order not only an
injunction against violation of the provisions ... of the Act, and reinstate-
ment of employees wrongfully discharged, but also an award of reparations
for wages lost by employees because of their wrongful discharge. Thereaf-
ter ... the Second Circuit held in McComb v. Frank Salim & Sons [77
F.2d 137, 140 (2c1 Cir. 1949)] ... that a District Court. proceeding under
its unrestricted general equity powers, had jurisdiction, in an injunctive ac-
tion brought by the Secretary under § 17 as it then stood, to award reiant-
firms to employees for unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation
to which their past services entitled them.
Evidently dissatisfied with those decisions, Congress ... added subsec-
tion (c) to § 16 and the proviso to
	 17 of the Act.... The Conference
Report .. said. respecting the proviso. that: "The provision 	 will have
the effect of reversing such decisions as McComb v. Scerbo ...."
Consumer Credit Protection Act, mpra note 129, at 415 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert De
Mario Jewelry, Inc„ 361 U.S. 288, 300-01 (1970) (Whittaker, J., dissenting)).
:14k1 Justice Rehnquist, in the concurring opinion of' Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. at 718, stated that, although it is better for Congress to specify when
it intends a private cause of action, cases such as Barak and numerous cases from other
federal cowls had given Congress "good reason to think that the federal judiciary
would undertake this task," at least during die time when several titles of the Civil
Rights Act were enacted,
24"
 444 U.S. at 32 -33 (White, J., dissenting).
":"' 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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[W]here the complaint ... is so drawn as to seek recovery directly
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal
court, but for two possible exceptions [where the claim is either im-
material or insubstantial and frivolous] ... must. entertain the
suit.... The reason for this is that the court must assume jurisdic-
tion to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on
which the court can grant relief as well as to determine issues of fact
arising in the controversy. 27'1
Thus, jurisdiction is no impediment to viewing implication as a permissible
judicial function.
While the implication of private rights of action can be justified as a per-
missible judicial function, there also exists strong support for viewing impli-
cation as a necessary judicial function. For example, a consideration of the
restriction under which Congress operates in providing statutory remedies high-
lights the need for judicial implication. In passing legislation, Congress must
often decide upon remedial and penal schemes without any previous oppor-
tunity to measure their practical effectiveness. 252 What. may appear to be a
complete and efficient system of enforcement. at the time of enactment may in
fact do little to curtail the practices that the statute was designed to prevent. 25"
Therefore, it should not be presumed that Congress desires exclusivity of
remedy unless it expressly says so. Rather, the statutory remedies enacted by
the legislature should be viewed as nonexclusive because specific violations
for which Congress did not expressly provide may occur. To effectuate the
statutory goals, these statutory remedies should be supplemented, when
needed, by the judiciary. The judicial branch is well suited to such a task
because, unlike the legislature, it is able to observe a statute in operation and
to decide the actual effectiveness of its enforcement mechanism. 254
The need for viewing implication as a judicial task is apparent even
where a statute permits an administrative agency to bring suit. Administrative
agencies are admittedly understaffed, and therefore the statutory goals may
not be met unless the courts offer assistance by implying private rights of
action. For example, the Borah Court observed that the SEC's lack of person-
nel made an independent examination of the facts set, out in all proxy mate-
rial received by them an impossibility."' Consequently, violations due to the
presence of misleading statements in the material may never have been
punished without judicial implication. The lack of administrative personnel
was also noted in the dissenting opinion in Touche Ross. There, Justice Mar-
shall observed that implying a private right of action under section 17(a) of
the 1934 Act would facilitate the SEC's enforcement efforts, because the SEC
lacked the resources to audit all the documents that brokers had filed. 2 " °
25 ' Note, imphing Civil Remedies from Federal Regulaloiy Statutes, 77 FT ARV. L. Rev
285, 288 (1963) (quoting Bell v. Flood, 327 U.S. at 681-82).
252
 Some Implications Jar Implication, supra mine 108, at 1393.
253 Id.
2:i4
27 377 U.S. at 432.
2 " 442 U.S. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Similarly, the Lewis dissent noted that although 5,385 investment advisers
were registered with the SEC in 1977, the SEC was able to conduct only 459
inspections of investment advisers that year. 257 Thus the Commission rightly
maintained that private litigation was a necessary supplement to SEC en-
forcement. activity, 258 Finally, the implication of private rights of action
should be considered among the duties of the courts even where a statute
provides for exclusive administrative enfocement. Frequently administrative
agencies—such as the SEC—can offer only prospective, not retrospective, re-
lief. Such a remedy standing alone is contrary to the notion of redress for
wrongs clone, which underlies our common law system of justice.
In summary, the implication of private rights of action, since it involves
enforcement rather than creation of norms, should be viewed as an appro-
priate function of the judiciary. The need for such a view becomes apparent
after noting the restrictions imposed upon Congress as it attempts to formu-
late statutory remedies. Because implication is a function of the judiciary, a
favorable judicial attitude towards the implication doctrine is justified, and
consequently the rigid Lewis test, which restricts the implication of private
rights to the point where virtually none will be implied, should be replaced.
C. A Proposed Test for Implied Rights of Action
In place of the test utilized by the Lewis Court, it is proposed that a two
part test be employed by the courts to determine whether a cause of action
should be inferred under a particular statute. This two pronged analysis will
balance the need for more frequent judicial implication with the necessity of
preventing a sudden flood of litigation. Thus, while allowing the courts to
imply private remedies where appropriate, the proposed test will not burden
the judiciary with an overflow of litigants whose injuries bear, at best, only a
tangential relation to the statute under which they seek an implied right. of
action.
The first part of the proposed test asks whether the implication of such a
remedy For the plaintiff is consistent with the goals of the legislative scheme.
In responding to this inquiry, it should be determined (a) if the plaintiff is
within the class which the statute is intended to benefit, and (b) if the plaintiff
has suffered the kind of injury against which the statute was designed to pro-
tect.. If both of these are answered affirmatively, the first part of the proposed
lest has been satisfied. It should be noted that this initial prong is similar to
both the first and third Curt factors, which concern benefited class and statu-
tory purpose, respectively. Because these two Curt factors are overlapping, it is
more practical and concise to consider the benefited class and statutory aim
together. The initial portion of this suggested analysis is, however, less dif-
ficult to satisfy than either the first or third Curt factors because, unlike Cort,
it clues not require the plaintiff' either to be a primary beneficiary of the statute
or to have suffered the type of injury against which the statute was prima,*
intended to protect. Rather, the plaintiff will meet this section of the pro-
237 444 U.S. at 35 n.1 9 .
238 Id. at 35.
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posed test if a reasonable interpretation of the statute indicates that he is an
intended beneficiary of the legislation and that his injury was one against
which the legislative scheme was designed to protect.
The second and final portion of the suggested test seeks to determine
whether, within the legislative history and statutory scheme, there is any indi-
cation of a legislative intent to deny such an action. If any such indication is
found, an implied remedy is not to be granted. In applying this prong of the
test it is not necessary to find an intent to create a private right of action.
Consequently, unless there is strong evidence of congressional intent to deny
a private remedy, the second prong of this test will be satisfied. Furthermore,
under this section of the test, the expressio maxim, so prominent in Amtrak,
Touche Ross, and Lewis, should not be applied in attempting to demonstrate a
congressional intent to deny a private right of action. The rationale for pro-
scribing the use of' the expressio maxim is that this principle is founded on an
unreliable premise. The maxim presumes that all remedies not. expressly pro-
vided in the statute were considered and rejected by the legislative draftsmen
before enacting the legislation. 25 " Although this premise represents one pos-
sible interpretation of the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of
others, there are at least two additional plausible explanations. For instance,
the inclusion of remedies in one section of a statute can be construed as a
restriction on the implication of other remedies but only within that specific
section of the statute. Under this construction, the full array of remedies
available under common law can still be implied under other sections of the
statute. 21 " In addition, a more likely interpretation of the legislature's intent
in providing only certain statutory remedies is that. Congress, without benefit.
of hindsight, did not anticipate that other remedies would be necessary to
ensure complete protection for those injured by violations of the statute. 2"
Under this interpretation, the legislature would have included other remedies
within the statute, had it foreseen the need. Thus, because the expressio maxim
is founded on an interpretation which is most likely inaccurate, it is unfair to
apply the principle in an implication decision. This is especially true because
25" This was the view expressed by the court in National Petroleum Refiners
Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), with
respect to the expressio principle: "Whis maxim is increasingly considered unreliable
... for it stands on the faculty premise that all possible alternative or supplemental
provisions were necessarily considered and rejected by the legislative draftsmen. - Id. at
676 (citations omitted). This view echoed that of Durnin v. Allentown Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Stipp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1963), where the court stated:
The doctrine expressio unius est exclusio allerius is at best an unreliable basis
for ascertaining intention. Its premise is that the draftsman has made a
comprehensive review of all possible related provisions, from which the
inference is to be drawn that his silence indicates a discriminating judg-
ment of rejection. Such a conclusion usually is unrealistic, for it assumes
too much foresight in the draftsman.
Id. a t 7 19:
2 " See Consumer Credit Protection Act, supra note 129, at 407. This reasoning was
applied in Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2c1 Cir. 1944) (implied private right of
action granted under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970)).
2 " 1 See Some Implications for Implication, supra note 108, at 1417.
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an application of this principle, with its exclusion of all remedies not expressly
provided, practically ensures the denial of the implied cause of action sought.
Since use of the expressio maxim is proscribed, this part of the proposed test is
more favorable towards implication than the second Cort Factor, which, al-
though it did not utilize the expressio principle, did not proscribe its use.
In summary, the two pronged analysis suggested herein, with its emphasis
on intended rather than primary statutory goals and its elimination of the
expressio maxim, encourages implication of private remedies more than recent
Supreme Court decisions. Nevertheless, its guidelines still prevent an indis-
criminate use of implication, for a court can imply a private right of action
under the proposed test. only if it finds that both factors have been satisfied.
If this test, had been applied in Transamerica v. Lewis the Court would
have held that a private cause of action could be implied from section 206 of
the Investment. Advisers Act, since both prongs of the test would have been
met. Under the initial prong of the test, the first query, seeking to determine
the plaintiff's membership in the benefited class, would be satisfied because
both the language and legislative history of section 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act., according to the Lewis Court, was intended to benefit the clients
of investment advisers, and the Lewis plaintiff represented a member of that
class of clients. 2 " 2 The second query under the initial portion of the test,
searching to discover whether the plaintiff's injury was one against which the
statute was designed to protect, also would be answered affirmatively in Lewis.
The majority opinion conceded that the purpose of section 206 was to protect
those injured by the fraudulent practices of investment advisers, 2" and the
plaintiff alleged that the injury was caused by the various frauds and breaches
of fiduciary duties of its investment adviser. 2 "4 Consequently, the implication
of a private right for the plaintiff, representing the victims of such practices,
is consistent with the statutory purpose, and the first portion of the suggested
test. is satisfied.
The latter portion of the proposed test, searching for an indication of
legislative intent to deny such an action, also would be satisfied when applied
to the facts in Lewis. The reason for this is first that the proposed test pro-
hibits use of the expressio maxim so widely utilized by the Lewis Court. In
addition, the Court found neither clear legislative history nor an express
statement in the statute indicating that. SEC remedies are exclusive. Thus, ap-
plication of the two pronged analysis suggested herein to the facts of Lewis
would have resulted in an implied cause of action for plaintiff Lewis. Fur-
thermore, the adoption of this proposed test, rather than the Lewis test, by fu-
ture courts would mean a vast reduction in the number of abandoned plain-
tiffs and frustrated statutory goals.
CoNcLustoN
The refusal of the Court in Transamerica v. Lewis to imply a private cause
of action under section 206 263 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 clearly
262" 444 U.S. at 17.
263 Id. at 24.
264 Id. at 13.
2"5 15 U.S.C.	 801)-6 (1976).
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indicates the Court's adoption of an even more restrictive approach than pre-
viously utilized in the implication inquiry. The judicial disenchantment with
the implied rights doctrine began in the mid-1970's, after the liberal Barak
decision led to an overflow of implied rights of action. The Court, however,
apparently viewed as insufficient, at least for the securities area, the restraints
placed upon the implication doctrine through the use of the expressio maxim
in Amtrak and the narrow application of a four factor test in Corl. Con-
sequently, it eliminated the two more easily satisfied Corl factors in Touche
Ross, and in Lewis reduced its implication analysis to only one factor. This one
factor test of Lewis, with its dependency on the expressio principle, will pre-
clude the implication of innumerable private rights of action. Therefore, in its
place a two pronged analysis, more easily satisfied than the Lewis test, is
suggested. If adopted, it would reverse the current anti-implication trend of
the Court, a trend which has already denied to many injured victims the rem-
edy justice demands.
LINDA J. HOARD
